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Escrow agent’s duty of care to nonparties:
Summit Fin. Holdings v Continental Lawyers Title,(2001
Roger Bernhardt
Escrow holder that follows principal’s escrow instructions owes no duty of care to
nonparties to the escrow.
Summit Fin. Holdings, Ltd. v Continental Lawyers Title Co. (2001) 87 CA4th 1379, 105 CR2d
352
Talbert Financial (Talbert) made a $425,000 loan secured by a deed of trust, which Talbert
immediately assigned to Summit Financial Holdings (Summit). Talbert recorded the assignment
of the deed of trust, but neither Talbert nor Summit notified the borrower of the assignment, as
required by CC §2937. A year later, the borrower refinanced the loan—i.e., paid off the loan
with the proceeds of a new loan—using a title company as escrow holder. Summit was not a
party to the escrow. The title company prepared a preliminary title report showing the Talbert
deed of trust and the assignment from Talbert to Summit. Talbert submitted a payoff demand
requesting that payment be made to Talbert (not Summit), and the parties to the escrow
instructed the title company to pay off the loan by issuing a check to Talbert. At close of escrow,
the title company paid Talbert in accordance with those instructions. Talbert did not remit the
funds to Summit, in breach of their assignment agreement.
The borrower later filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In connection with a sale of the
borrower’s property free of liens, the bankruptcy court disallowed Summit’s lien on the ground
that the payoff to Talbert in the refinancing extinguished the borrower’s obligations under the
original loan. Summit then sued the title company for negligence, claiming that the title company
should have issued the payoff check to Summit instead of Talbert because it knew of the
assignment. Relying on Kirby v Palos Verdes Escrow Co. (1986) 183 CA3d 57, 227 CR 785, the
trial court held that the title company owed a duty of care to Summit, even though Summit was
not a party to the escrow, and breached that duty by paying Talbert instead of Summit.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the title company did not owe a duty of care to
Summit. An escrow holder’s primary duty is to strictly perform the instructions of the parties to
the escrow. The court held that an escrow holder that follows its principals’ instructions cannot
be liable in negligence to a nonparty stranger to the escrow. The court disagreed with Kirby’s
holding to the contrary, stating that Kirby was wrongly decided and should not be followed.
Instead, the court followed the general rule that an escrow holder is not liable for failing to do
something not required by the escrow instructions, or for a loss caused by following the escrow
instructions.
The borrower and the new lender engaged the title company to assist in closing the new loan,
and any effect of that transaction on Summit was collateral to the purpose of the escrow. The title
company could not have foreseen that Talbert would breach its obligation to disburse the funds
to Summit. Moreover, Summit caused its own injury by failing to notify the borrower of the
assignment as required by CC §2937. Finally, “imposing a duty here would have the anomalous
effect that the original debtor is exonerated from liability on his debt by his agent’s payment to

Talbert but the agent making that payment for its principal becomes liable on that debt.” 87
CA4th at 1390. For these reasons, the court found no basis for permitting Summit to recover
from the title company.
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: [Note: Feeling slightly uncertain about what I said below, I sent a
draft of this comment to my colleague, Professor Dale Whitman of the University of Missouri,
who is the author of the article I cite below, as well as the Reporter for the recent Restatement of
Mortgages. His response was so interesting that I have inserted it below, in brackets, as
counterpoint to my remarks. RB]
Although the rule announced by the court is clear, I find the circumstances for its application
somewhat confusing.
First, as to the underlying bankruptcy litigation and the liability of the borrower, I don’t know
what CC §2937 had to do with the matter. That code section requires that notice of transfer of
servicing of a debt on one-to-four residential units be given to the borrower. Assuming that this
was that kind of property, I don’t see that any transfer of servicing was involved. There is no
mention of any servicing agent at all, and the note calls for direct payments to the payee. That
should put the assignment of that note under CC §2935, which deals with assignments of the
note and mortgage, rather than under §2937. But §2935 concentrates not on whether actual
notice was given, but on whether the payment was made “to the person holding such note,” and
that fact is not told to us.
[Prof. Whitman: I agree with you. The term “transfer of servicing” is routinely understood in
the mortgage banking industry to mean a transfer of only the servicing rights, and not an
assignment of the underlying obligation (note). Of course, the “evil” that the legislature refers to
in the introduction to §2937 is equally a problem when the note itself is transferred with no
notice to the obligor. So it would have made sense for §2937 to define “transfer of servicing,”
and to define it broadly enough to include assignment of the obligation. But the legislature didn’t
provide any definition at all, and in this situation I think a court would have to accept the
ordinary understanding of the term in the industry. Incidentally, §2937 isn’t unique: federal law
also requires notification of the borrower when servicing is transferred. See 12 USC §2605,
adopted by Congress in 1990 as part of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974
(RESPA). But the annotations to that section, likewise, give no indication that “transfer of
servicing” would be construed to include transfer of the obligation itself.]
Civil Code §2937 has never been interpreted, and may have been intended to displace §2935
entirely when small residential properties are involved. If so, the debtor may safely continue to
pay his original creditor no matter how many times the actual note and deed of trust have been
transferred and the transfers recorded, so long as he has never received the required statutory
notice. For other properties, §2935 would still apply, meaning that a debtor should still require
her creditor to produce the note to prove that he still has it before she pays him (the infamous
“payment rule”). See Whitman, Reforming the Law: The Payment Rule as a Paradigm, 1998
BYU L Rev 1169. And, because an assignment of a single-family mortgage note might not
constitute a transfer of its “servicing,” I think that is good advice in any case. It may not be

realistic to expect debtors to require production of the note regularly, and the risk of loss is small
when a reputable lending institution is involved, but it can avoid a painful loss.
[Prof. Whitman: Although the opinion never mentions any servicing agent, that doesn’t mean
there wasn’t one. Noninstitutional lenders routinely use them. But even if there was a servicing
agent, there is not the slightest indication that (1) the servicing was transferred, or (2) the transfer
of any servicing had anything to do with the problem that arose in the case.]
Second, as to the escrow agent’s behavior, on what basis did it honor Talbert’s (the
creditor/assignor’s) payoff demand? It is unlikely that it would send Talbert the money without
requiring Talbert to surrender the note (marked “paid”) and the deed of trust (for reconveyance).
If that actually happened, the note and deed of trust would still be valid but for §2937. It is more
likely that the escrow agent did receive these documents from Talbert, which means that Talbert
retained them despite the assignment to Summit. If so, then Summit brought the loss on itself
regardless of which code section applies: under §2937 it gave no notice to the borrower, and
under §2935, its failure to take possession of the note made its recording of the assignment
ineffectual.
[Prof. Whitman: We’re only speculating, but I would bet that (contrary to your supposition)
the title company did indeed send the payoff check to Talbert without requiring him to produce
the note first. Escrow companies and other closers nearly always do so, in my observation. If
your supposition is correct, and if Talbert did indeed retain the note, then if the note was
negotiable under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code [in California, Division 3 of the
California Commercial Code], the right to payment was not legally and effectively transferred to
Summit, and the title company did nothing that could be remotely construed as wrong. However,
if my supposition is correct, then the title company was indeed negligent. Moreover, the title
company had already issued a preliminary title report showing the assignment of the mortgage.
In all probability, a copy of that title report was actually in the hands of the escrow officer. Under
these circumstances, even someone like me who believes the payment rule is wrong and ought to
be changed would be hard-pressed to exonerate the escrow officer. I bet he had actual knowledge
that he was sending the check to the wrong party.]
Whether or not the escrow agent owed a duty of care to Summit or fell below that duty, it
seems clear to me that Summit itself was pretty careless. —Roger Bernhardt (and Dale
Whitman)

